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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Dewayne Banks appeals from the district court's order summarily
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of Prior Post-Conviction Proceedings
The facts and course of proceedings relating to Banks' first postconviction action are as set forth by the district court in its order granting the
state's motion for summary dismissal:
On September 20, 2000, Petitioner was convicted following
a trial by jury of the felony offense of Robbery as charged in Part I
of the information and his guilty plea to a Persistent Violator
sentence enhancement allegation. Petitioner filed a Motion for
The Court
Judgment of Acquittal on October 4, 2000.
subsequently denied the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on
November 24, 2000 and on December 15, 2000 the Court
sentenced Petitioner to a minimum period of confinement of ten
(10) years, and a subsequent indeterminate period of confinement
of not to exceed life, for a total unified term of life.
The Petitioner filed a pro se notice of Appeal on January 23,
2001. The State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) was appointed
to represent Petitioner in this appeal.
Thereafter, Petitioner filed a pro se Rule 35 motion seeking
reduction of his sentence, which was subsequently denied by the
Court on June 14, 2001. On June 26, 2001 the Petitioner filed a
pro se Notice of Appeal on the denial of his Rule 35 Motion. The
SAPD was appointed to represent Petitioner on his appeal from the
Rule 35 Denial.
On June 4, 2002 the Court of Appeals issued its
Unpublished Opinion Number 640 (Docket Nos. 27207 & 27629)
affirming the sentence imposed and affirming this Court's Order
denying Petioners [sic} Rule 35 motion. A Petition for Review was
subsequently denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals has
now become final.
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On September 4,
Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for
Post Conviction reHef, Canyon County case number CV-200208175*C. The Court entered its final Order dismissing the Petition
on October 1, 2003. Petitioner filed an appeal and the Idaho
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on July 23, 2004, Remitittur
[sic] filed October 21, 2004 (No. 30070).
Thereafter, on October 26, 2005, Petitioner filed a pro se
Notice of Appeal from the Order of Dismissal. This appeal was
dismissed by the Idaho Supreme Court on November 7, 2005,
Remittitur filed January 3, 2006 (No. 32436).
(R., pp.99-100.)

Statement of Facts and Course of Successive Post-Conviction Proceedings
The course of events of Banks' current petition for post-conviction relief
were outlined by the district court in its order granting the state's motion for
summary dismissal:
On June 18, 2009, the Petitioner, filed a pro se Petition and
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief
which was assigned Case No. CV 2009-0006327*C. On June 29,
2009, Petitioner filed a pro se Motion for Appointment of Counsel,
Affidavit, and Memorandum of Law in Support of Appointment of
Counsel.
On July 21, 2009, this Court ordered the appointment of the
Canyon County Public Defender to represent Petitioner in this
case. The Order appointing the Public Defender granted that office
forty-five (45) days to investigate Petitioner's case and, if
necessary, to file an amended petition.
On August 3, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro se Motion to
Disqualify Weibe and Fouser, P.A., Canyon County Public
Defender, Affidavit, and Memorandum in Support of Motion. On
August 6, 2009, this Court appointed Mimura Law Offices to
represent Petitioner. The Order appointing Mimura Law Offices
gave that office forty-five (45) days to investigate Petitioner's case
and, if necessary, file an amended petition. No amended petition
has been filed.
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On September 3, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro se Motion to
Disqualify the Law Firm of Mimura Law Offices, Affidavit, and
Memorandum in Support of Motion. On September 8, 2009, this
Court entered its Order Denying Motion to Disqualify Law Firm.
On October 14, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro se Motion for
Extension of Time to Amend Petition on Post-Conviction Relief
requesting a thirty (30) day extension to file a pro se amended
petition. Also, on October 14, 2009, Petitioner filed a prose Motion
for Correction of Clerical Errors on Request for Discovery on PostConviction Relief. Petitioner filed a Motion for Hearing on these
motions on November 20, 2009.
On October 26, 2009 the State filed its Objection to
Petitioner's motion for extension of time and motion for correction
of clerical errors on the grounds that the motions were
impermissibly made pro se after the Court's August 6, 2009,
appointment of counsel.
On November 20, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro se Motion for
Hearing on Petitioner's motion for extension of time and motion for
correction of clerical errors.
The State filed an Answer on December 4, 2009 asserting
the affirmative defenses of, inter alia, failure to state a claim, failure
to raise claims on direct appeal, statute of limitations, failure to
verify the petition, failure to support petition with admissible
evidence, improper successive petition, and failure to allege
sufficient facts to warrant a finding that counsel's performance was
deficient. The State's Answer was filed together with a Motion for
Summary Dismissal. The Motion for Summary Dismissal is brought
on the grounds that the Petition is not verified, not timely, and
improper successive application pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908.
(R., pp.98-99.)

The district court granted the state's motion for summary dismissal
because it found Banks' petition for post-conviction relief was untimely and an
improper successive petition.

(R., pp.100-101.)

The court denied Banks'

request to alter or amend the judgment on post-conviction (R., pp.304-24) and
entered an order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief (R., p.325).
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his petition. (R., pp.325,

Banks timely appeals from the
327-30).
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ISSUE
Banks states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr.
Bank's [sic] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as untimely and as a
successive petition, and/or failed to grant Mr. Bank's [sic] Motion to
Alter or Amend?
(Appellant's brief, p.2.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Banks failed to establish that the district court erred by summarily
dismissing his successive post-conviction petition?
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ARGUMENT
Banks Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred By Summarily
Dismissing His Successive Post-Conviction Petition
A.

Introduction
The district court dismissed Banks' successive petition, finding the petition

was not timely filed because the statutory time to file had expired on August 8,
2003 and Banks filed his prose petition for post-conviction relief almost six years
later on June 18, 2009. (R., p.101.) The district court further found in dismissing
Banks' petition that it was an improper successive petition for post-conviction
relief as Banks' claims had previously been raised in his direct appeals and prior
petition for post-conviction relief and Banks had failed to assert "a sufficient
reason for why grounds for relief were not adequately raised in the original
petition." (R., p.101.) On appeal, Banks claims his petition was in fact timely "in
light of his federal habeus [sic] corpus case which he contends is a proceeding
following an appeal as contemplated by I.C. § 19-4902(1 )" and, as such, the
court "erred by summarily dismissing his petition as untimely." (Appellant's brief,
p.4.)

Banks also contends that he "made a substantial factual showing that his

claim for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt
and could not have, in the exercise of due diligence, been raised earlier," thus
entitling him to file a successive petition under I.C. § 19-4901. (Appellant's brief,
p.7.)
Banks' arguments are without merit.
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B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction application, the appellate

court will review the entire record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require that relief be granted.
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The
court freely reviews the district court's application of the law.

C.

kl

Dismissal Of Banks' Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Was
Appropriate Because It Was Untimely Filed And Banks Failed To Allege
Facts That, If True, Would Overcome The Successive Petition Bar And
Entitle Him To Post-Conviction Relief
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil

proceeding

and the petitioner bears the

burden of establishing,

by a

preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).

However, a petition for post-conviction

relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain
more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a
complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P.
8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations.
4903).

kl

(citing I.C. § 19-

Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application

must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary
hearing.

Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982);

Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999).
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Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary
for post-conviction relief when the applicant's evidence has

an application
no genuine

issue of material fact, which if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the
applicant to the requested relief.

Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861, 863, 979

P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App. 1999); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892
P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c), a district court
may dismiss a post-conviction application on the motion of any party when it
appears that the applicant is not entitled to relief. Specifically, LC. § 19-4906(c)
provides:
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary
disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Applying these principles in this case, the district court summarily
dismissed Banks' petition as being untimely and improperly successive.
Contrary to Banks' assertions on appeal, a review of the record and the
applicable law supports the district court's order of summary dismissal.
1. Banks' Successive Petition Was Untimely
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires that a post-conviction proceeding be
commenced by filing a petition "any time within one (1) year from the expiration
of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the
determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later."

In the

case of successive petitions, the Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that rigid
application of I.C. § 19-4902 would preclude courts from considering 'claims
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which simply are not known to the defendant within the time limit, yet raise
important due process issues."' Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250 220 P.3d
1066, 1069 (2009) (quoting Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d
870, 874 (2007)).

In those circumstances, the court will apply a "reasonable

time" standard. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 251, 220 P.3d at 1070. "In determining
what a reasonable time is for filing a successive petition, [the court] will simply
consider it on a case-by-case basis, as has been done in capital cases."
Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875.

However, absent a showing

by the petitioner that the limitation period should be tolled, the failure to file a
timely petition for post-conviction relief is a basis for dismissal of the petition.
Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 247,220 P.3d at 1066.
All the claims in Banks' successive petition, filed June 18, 2009, were filed
beyond one year after the issuance of the Remittitur in Banks' direct appeal filed
in August of 2002. Banks does not argue that his claims were not known to him
or could not reasonably have been known to him in the requisite time-frame for
filing his initial post-conviction petition.

Instead, Banks asserts "the habeas

corpus proceedings that ended on April 20, 2009 with the final denial of his writ
for certiorari constituted a proceeding following an appeal under I.C. § 19-4902,
which would then make his June 18, 2009 application for post-conviction relief
timely filed" under I.C. § 19-4902.

(Appellant's brief, p.5.)

Although Banks'

direct appeals were exhausted upon the Court of Appeals' affirming of the
sentence imposed and decision denying his Rule 35 motion and the subsequent
denial of a petition for review (R., p.100), Banks contends the filing of his
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successive pro se petition for post-conviction relief some six years later was
timely because of the previous stay of his habeas proceedings.

(Appellant's

brief, pp.4-6.)
Banks' argument is unsupported by cited precedent and is contrary to law.
The statute of limitations for filing a post-conviction petition begins to run "from
the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or
from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal." I.C. § 19-4902. '"[A]
proceeding following an appeal . . . does not encompass a separately filed
proceeding under the UPCPA or one for relief such as by way of a writ of habeas
corpus, subsequent to the judgment of conviction." Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho
627, 629, 836 P.2d 1088, 1090 (Ct. App. 1992). Because Banks failed to file his
successive petition within one year of the final determination of his direct appeal,
he has failed to show that the district court erred in dismissing his successive
petition as untimely.
2. Banks' Petition For
Successive Petition

Post-Conviction

Relief Was

An

Improper

Banks' petition was also correctly dismissed on the basis that it failed to
satisfy the criteria for a permissible successive petition under the UPCPA. Idaho
Code § 19-4908 governs the filing of successive petitions and provides:
Waiver of or failure to assert claims. - All grounds for relief
available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his
original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally
adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction
or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to
secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application,
unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for
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sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in
the original, supplemental, or amended application.
I.C. § 19-4908.

In interpreting this statute, Idaho's appellate courts have held

that "[i]neffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel may provide
sufficient reason for permitting newly asserted allegations or allegations
inadequately raised in the initial application to be raised in a subsequent postconviction application." Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400,
403 (Ct. App. 2008) (footnote omitted) (citing Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591,
596, 635 P.2d 955, 960 (1981 ); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992
P.2d 789, 793 (Ct. App. 1999)). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel,
however, a post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate both that (a) his
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
(b) the.re is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687-88 (1984). Although Banks argues otherwise, a review of the record
shows that Banks did not make even a prima facie showing of ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel to establish a "sufficient reason" to justify
the filing of his successive petition in this case.
Banks' pro se successive petition for post-conviction relief alleged
numerous claims of the ineffectiveness of trial counsel, but Banks did not assert
he was inadequately represented by post-conviction counsel in his first postconviction action.

Subsequent to the district court's order granting the state's

motion for summary dismissal based on timeliness and the failure of Banks to
assert sufficient reason why grounds for relief were not adequately raised in his
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original post-conviction petition to allow a successive petition (R., pp. 98-102),
Banks filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment putting forth his general
complaint that post-conviction counsel failed "to do anything whatsoever" on his
behalf (R., pp.104-105).
Banks' argument on appeal is that he was entitled to file a successive
petition for post-conviction relief because "he has made a substantial factual
showing that his claim for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of
the finding of guilt and could not have, in the exercise of due diligence, been
raised earlier."

(Appellant's brief, p.7.)

He asserts "the ineffectiveness of his

attorney at his first post-conviction prevented him from properly presenting his
arguments." (Appellant's brief, p.7.) The court, however, found in granting the
state's motion to summarily dismiss Banks' petition for post-conviction as an
improper successive petition that "the record before the Court shows that
Petitioner's claims have previously been raised in Petitioner's appeals and prior
petition for post conviction relief."

(R., p.101.)

Further, the district court was

unable to find that Banks had "asserted a sufficient reason for why grounds for
relief were not adequately raised in the original petition."

(R, p.101.)

In

reiterating these findings when denying Banks' motion to alter or amend the
judgment on post-conviction relief, the court concluded as follows:
In addition, the Court further finds and concludes that
Petitioner has failed to make a "substantial factual showing by
affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief
raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt
and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been
presented earlier." I.C. § 19-4901 (emphasis original).
The
petitioner relies on ineffective assistance of counsel at every stage
in the proceedings during the last ten (10) years in which he has
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fervently continued to pursue relief from the judgment as the basis
for why the Court should grant him relief in the current petition. For
the reasons herein, that argument is without merit.
The Court still further finds and concludes that the claims for
relief asserted in his petition for post-conviction relief in this case
are claims for relief he had previously raised in the several prior
proceedings discussed in Section II above, and were fully known to
him for many years prior to his filing of his post-conviction petition
in the case on June 18, 2009.
(R., pp.322-23.) Banks has failed to show otherwise.

The district court correctly dismissed Banks' petition on the ground that it
did not meet the statutory requirements for a permissible successive petition
under I.C. § 19-4908 as the record supports the district court's finding that Banks
failed to make a substantial factual showing as to the ineffectiveness of his postconviction counsel.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order summarily dismissing Banks' successive petition for post-conviction relief.
st

DATED this 1

day of March 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
CERTIFY that on this 1st day of March 2012, I caused two true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRI
OF RESPONDENT to be placed in
the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
STEPHEN D. THOMPSON
P.O. BOX 1707
KETCHUM, ID 83340
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